1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA AT CHARLESTON	
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4	EQT PRODUCTION COMPANY,	: CIVIL ACTION
5	Plaintiff	
5	-vs-	: : :
7	MATTHEW D. WENDER, in hi	
3	official capacity as Pre of the County Commission	of :
)	Fayette County, West Vir DENISE A. SCALPH, in her	official:
)	capacity as a Commission the County Commission of	:
	Fayette County, West Virginia, : and JOHN H. LOPEZ, in his :	
	official capacity as a : Commissioner of the County :	
}	Commission of Fayette County, : West Virginia, :	
:	Defenda	nts. :
		NSCRIPT OF HEARING RABLE JOHN T. COPENHAVER, JR.,
	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE	
	J2	ANUARY 19, 2016
	APPEARANCES:	
	For the Plaintiff:	TIMOTHY M. MILLER, ESQ. CHRISTOPHER B. POWER, ESQ.
		Babst Calland Suite 1000
		300 Summers Street Charleston, WV 25301
	For the Defendants:	THOMAS A. RIST, ESQ.
		Rist Law Offices 103 Fayette Avenue
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)		

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20	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced by computer.
21	CATHERINE L. SCHUTTE-STANT, RMR, CRR
22	Federal Official Court Reporter 300 Virginia Street, East
23	Room 6009 Charleston, WV 25301
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25	

1 10:05 a.m. PROCEEDINGS 2 THE CLERK: All rise. 3 THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated. 4 THE CLERK: The case before the Court is EQT Production Company versus Matthew Wender, Denise Scalph, and 5 6 John Lopez, each in his or her official capacity as a 7 Commissioner of the Fayette County Commission, Case Number 8 16-cv-00290. 9 Will counsel please state your name and appearances for 10 the record? 11 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, Tim Miller and 12 Christopher Power on behalf of the plaintiff, EQT Production 13 Corporation. We have a corporate representative, Mr. Joey 14 Stumbo, also present in the courtroom with us. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. 16 MR. RIST: Good morning, Your Honor. Tom Rist and 17 Prosecutor Larry Harrah from Fayette County. We represent 18 the defendants in this case. And Matthew Wender, one of the 19 defendants, is seated at counsel table with us. 20 THE COURT: Thank you. This matter is before the 21 Court on the motion for a temporary restraining order. 22 The Court, I will tell you at the outset, would expect 23 if the temporary retraining order were granted, that we 24 would grant it for a period of 14 days, in accordance with the rule. And then, either at that point, the preliminary 25

injunction request would be heard or the temporary restraining order would, by agreement of the parties, be continued for another seven days, so that the preliminary injunction hearing itself would occur on February 11th.

And so I wanted you to know that in advance, that even though the Court has directed the plaintiffs to provide notice to the defendants, that this will proceed, nevertheless, as though it is a temporary restraining order request at this juncture.

And with that, I would ask the parties whether or not you have any comments that you would wish to make before the Court hears that which you propose to present?

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, on behalf of the plaintiff, if the Court desires — we weren't sure whether you were going to take this up as a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction at this time. We have a witness here if the Court needed additional factual record upon which to make a finding. The witness would basically — as a proffer, I would tell you would merely testify that EQT operates 204 gas wells located within Fayette County, West Virginia. They also have one underground injection control well they operate in Fayette County, West Virginia.

And I would indicate to you that at those gas wells, producing gas wells, typically there is a tank in order to

collect water and other produced fluids that are a part of the natural process of producing a gas well. So there is fluid stored in those tanks at those producing gas well sites until the tanks reach a certain level where that fluid has to be removed and hauled and disposed of. And, in this case, disposed of in the underground injection control well operated by EQT.

So in terms of our standing, if you will, he is here if the Court needed a factual record that we actually own and operate gas wells, producing gas wells, how it would be affected by this ordinance as well as the underground injection control well that would be affected by this ordinance.

Given that the ban is total and complete on the storage, transportation, treatment, et cetera, any broadly defined natural gas waste or oil waste, it would essentially require it to be in compliance with this ordinance, EQT would have to shut-in or stop production on all 204 of those gas wells, producing gas wells, so that no fluid would be collected and stored onsite in those tanks, and it would also require the shutdown of the underground injection control well.

So I think on that basis we would be able to make or have made, I believe, given the verified complaint filed in this action, a sufficient factual record that the Court can

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make a finding that we, in fact, would have an injury in
fact here if this ordinance is taken effect, it would very
much impact the operations of EQT in Fayette County, West
Virginia.
     For that reason, we have requested temporary
restraining order relief. If you'd like me to go through
our counts and legal arguments, fine.
     If the Court would prefer to allow the parties to rely
on their briefing, I can do that as well. It's whatever the
Court's pleasure.
          THE COURT: Let me ask you to what extent the UIC
is used for wells outside the county?
          MR. MILLER: It is. There are surrounding
counties, nearby counties that are part of the same
district, what EQT calls the Madison District, basically
Jackson, Kanawha, Boone, Fayette, in that area. And the UIC
well does collect waste from various gas producing wells in
that location.
          THE COURT: What's the estimated number of wells,
aside from -- I believe you said 204 in Fayette County?
          MR. MILLER: That would be correct.
          THE COURT: -- that would be used in the UIC?
          MR. MILLER: If you'd let me check, Your Honor,
with the representative.
     (Pause.)
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            (An off-the-record discussion was held between Attorney
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       Timothy Miller and Mr. Stumbo.)
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                 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, we did actually check on
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       this. Approximately 500 wells in that region, 204 of which
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       are located in Fayette County.
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                 THE COURT: And so another near 300 would be
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       affected, as well?
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                 MR. MILLER: They would, Your Honor. And the
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       only --
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                 THE COURT: And those, of course, we're speaking
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       of producing oil and gas wells?
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                 MR. MILLER: Yes, those are producing wells,
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       correct. And these are conventional wells, vertical wells.
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                 THE COURT: Do I understand you to say that if the
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       plaintiff were not afforded this relief, it would
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       immediately have to cease its oil and gas production from
       those 500 wells?
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                 MR. MILLER: To be in compliance with the
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       ordinance, I believe we'd have to do something because, as
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       the gas is produced, there's fluid associated with it, which
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       is separated at the wellhead and goes into these tanks. And
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       as we read this ordinance, it would ban any type of storage
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       or collection of any natural gas waste, including water and
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       brine, which is primarily what is collected in these tanks.
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                 THE COURT: I think your position is that it's not
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       just that the UIC would be closed; you couldn't produce at
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       all, because you can't create waste?
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                 MR. MILLER: Correct.
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                 THE COURT: How many employees would be laid off
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       as a result?
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                 MR. MILLER: I don't know that they'd be laid off,
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       Your Honor, immediately. We'd obviously be seeking relief
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       if the ban were in effect. But we have approximately -- how
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       many employees in the region, in the Madison region?
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            (Off-the-record discussion was held between Attorney
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       Timothy Miller and Mr. Stumbo.)
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                 MR. MILLER: You would have eight employees whose
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       jobs primarily as well tenders to go to these well sites for
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       purposes of checking these tanks and other operations at
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       each producing gas well site, they would obviously have no
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       particular duties at that point, and the company would be
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       faced with a situation of either laying them off or --
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                 THE COURT: As a practical matter, each of these
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       wells pretty well operates on its own?
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                 MR. MILLER: Correct.
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                 THE COURT: And somebody has to be checking it
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       from time to time?
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                 MR. MILLER: Correct. And most wells are checked
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       at least once a month, depending on the particular well,
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       sometimes much more frequently than once a month.
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THE COURT: Thank you. If nothing further, Mr. Miller, let me call on the defendants.

And what I would really ask you initially is whether or not you take exception to any of the facts that are set forth in the Complaint, that is, as distinguished from whether or not the ordinance is a lawful law?

MR. RIST: We do, Your Honor. And I think the -obviously, it's one of the weaknesses of coming in and
responding so quickly to a -- to basically a TRO or a
request for a temporary restraining order is that we don't
have time to brief the Court and let the Court know where
our position is on those issues. But one of the issues
that's been brought up by the gentlemen this morning is
this -- the fact that they wouldn't be able to produce oil
or gas, which I think is outside the scope of what the
ordinance itself was written to do.

The ordinance itself under Section 1 states, "This prohibition shall specifically apply to disposal injection wells."

I think the point of the action that was taken by the County Commission was to stop the injection into that, into the UIC wells in Fayette County because of the risk that it poses to our drinking water. There's only two UIC wells that we know of in Fayette County or that we've discovered or have come out. And so that was really the focus of this

ordinance that was issued.

And in the request for an injunction in this case, one of the weaknesses of looking at that as, hey, we've got 200 wells that are producing oil and gas, we'll have to shut those down. Well, that's not -- I don't think that that's true under the facts of this case. And as this Court knows with the four-part test in issuing an injunction, the plaintiff has to show that they are going suffer irreparable harm without relief.

Well, no one has filed a case against EQT. The county commission hasn't sent them a cease and desist order. None of that has been done. It's just, hey, this might happen. Which I think is different than irreparable harm -- that they're likely to suffer irreparable harm without this.

And I think until someone does that or some action is taken against them, that they're not really risking anything. They can keep producing at those wells. There's no issue with that I've seen under this ordinance. That would be the argument that we would make.

As far as the UIC well having to be shut down, that would fall under the ordinance as written, Your Honor.

So that would be, I think, an issue that would have to come up or that we'd have to deal with in this hearing or at a later hearing.

The other thing I would bring the Court's attention to,

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a second case was filed in federal court in this district.
Our understanding is it hasn't been assigned to a judge yet.
But that was filed by Danny Webb Construction or Danny Webb.
I believe the attorney for Mr. Webb is sitting in the back
of the courtroom. He's from Bowles Rice. And it could be
that when we're dealing with these issues, we might want to
have these cases consolidated, because the complaints are
very similar. We're dealing with the same issues and we're
going to be bringing these up at a later day.
          THE COURT: When and where was that case filed?
         MR. RIST: That was filed on Friday in the
Southern District of West Virginia.
         THE COURT: Where?
         MR. RIST: Here in Charleston.
          THE COURT: And what's the style of the case?
         MR. RIST: It's Danny Webb -- I don't know the
exact entity name, but it's Danny Webb versus the three
defendants that are in this case. They may have named the
county commission as an entity as well, but I don't have it
sitting in front of me.
          THE COURT: Thank you.
         MR. RIST: You're welcome.
          THE COURT: And, Mr. Miller?
          MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor. We disagree in that
the -- if the argument is somehow this does not apply to
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producing gas wells and tanks where natural gas waste are collected and stored, I would point out that in the ordinance of Section 1, paragraphs 5 and 6, Paragraph Number 5, bans the sale, acquisition, storage, handling, treatment and/or processing of natural gas waste or oil waste within Fayette County. Period.

So the ordinance is very broad and applies to basically any storage or handling of anything that falls within the definition of natural gas waste or oil waste. And that definition clearly says it includes water, brine, or any other fluids associated with the production of natural gas.

So I disagree with the assertion that this only -- this ordinance, as drafted, only applies to UIC wells. It's very broad in its application. So I do take issue with that argument.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let me ask whether or not,
Mr. Rist, it is the case that the ordinance as set forth
here is accurately stated, and that it does include the
handling and treatment of those same substances, so that it
would relate to the production of oil and gas as well?

MR. RIST: The -- what's being proffered as what's in the ordinance is correct, Your Honor. It's the reading of the ordinance where we're disagreeing. But I have no issue with what they've presented as far as what the ordinance says.

I do think they're looking at it a little more broadly than what it was designed to do. But, yes, that's correct, what he said.

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, and I had one final point I forgot to mention as well. He mentioned there's no irreparable harm.

This is a criminal and civil statute. It indicates for every day somebody operates in violation, there is a penalty up to a total of five-million dollars, as well as it subjects the employees of EQT to criminal penalties, including up to one year in prison. So to the extent that we have a Hobson's choice to either willfully ignore an ordinance which is passed and risk criminal civil penalties or comply with the law, we're faced with a dilemma.

It's also a valuable property right, which we're going to be denied.

So we think, clearly, as the case law we cited to you, including there's a case in the Northern District, SWN Production versus Edge, decided by Judge Stamp last week, affirming that under West Virginia law, the denial of operating rights under an oil and gas lease is a valuable property right. And it, it is — is irreparable and can be cured by equity — inequity by injunctive relief.

So we think the West Virginia and federal case law would very clearly hold any type of damage to the property

rights of an operating oil and gas lease which prohibits you
from enjoying those real property rights is in fact itself
by definition irreparable harm.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further on that
matter, Mr. Rist?

MR. RIST: Well, Your Honor, I'm sitting beside

MR. RIST: Well, Your Honor, I'm sitting beside the prosecuting attorney of Fayette County. Surely they could contact them to deal with whether or not there would be an issue with running those gas wells.

As far as the balance of harms go, the reason that this ordinance was passed was to protect our water supply and to shut down the two UIC wells. You know, that's really what we're dealing with in this case.

The balance of harms on our side of it, there is 40-some-thousand people that drink water off the water system that's downstream from at least the Danny Webb well that's being dealt with in the other case. That's the risk that we're looking at.

If the Court were to say, well, when balancing these two against each other, you're going to lose a property right.

Well, is it a property right to be able to drink clean water out of your faucet? Charleston knows that.

And so I would think that the balance of harms here is not so clearcut and easily swayed to the side of the

1 plaintiff. 2 THE COURT: Thank you. Would you care to respond 3 to that, Mr. Miller? MR. MILLER: Your Honor, the fact that the 4 5 prosecutor is here and he might use some prosecutorial 6 discretion as to whether to indict or not is not -- is 7 little comfort to EQT. Which the prosecutor could change 8 his mind a year from now and we'd be facing a 9 five-million-dollar fine or the imprisonment of employees 10 who were working at these well sites or Mr. Stumbo here. 11 So I think clearly the fact that maybe the prosecutor 12 might interpret the ordinance in a less restrictive fashion 13 does not cure the fact that the ordinance on its face 14 broadly prohibits the very property rights of producing oil 15 and gas in operating the UIC well. 16 So I think facially the statute or ordinance on its 17 face is clearly preempted under the Oil and Gas Act, which 18 does not have any savings clause reserving to municipalities 19 and commissions any authority to regulate oil and gas 20 operations. There's no savings clause which saves them the 21 right. 22 It clearly preempts this field, the Oil and Gas Act, 23 Chapter 22, Article 6 of the West Virginia Code, and 24 subsequent articles. 25 So, clearly, the -- I don't think that solves our

problem, the fact the prosecutor today isn't going to file for indictment or a cease and desist order does not cure the fact the ordinance on its face is facially defective, is unconstitutional or illegal.

The preemption ordinance, as well as the Federal Safe
Drinking Water Act, I think it's clear, as well, this UIC
Program -- if we focus not just on the producing wells but
under UIC wells, it's clearly one that is regulated under
the Safe Drinking Water Act. The federal statute which
delegated to the state DEP certain abilities to regulate the
operations of this UIC well. We do have a permit from the
West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection to
operate this well.

Maybe we can tender that as an exhibit. I know we recited it in our pleadings, Your Honor, that we had a permit, but we didn't actually attach a copy of it to the pleadings.

If the Court would allow me, I would just tender it as an exhibit at this time.

THE COURT: You may present it, if you wish, but -- yes, hand it to counsel for the defendant, if you would.

MR. MILLER: So in terms of the irreparable harm argument, Your Honor, it clearly would negate what the state of West Virginia has allowed by this very permit I've

presented to you, the operation of the UIC well.

So we think in terms of what the interpretation of the statute would be, I think it was conceded that the statute at the very least is intended to ban and stop the operation of two UIC wells in the county, one of which is owned and operated by EQT.

So clearly it would be inconsistent, in conflict with the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act, UIC Program; it would conflict with our state permit for the DEP for operating the UIC well, and basically would contradict completely the DEP's authority to regulate the operations of the UIC well.

THE COURT: Thank you. You may want to respond to that, Mr. Rist, but I want to ask Mr. Miller another question first, and you can respond to both at the same time.

Is there any authority on a matter of this nature before any court in West Virginia other than, perhaps, in the Morgantown City case?

MR. MILLER: The Morgantown City case is the only one I'm aware of, Your Honor, that issued a written opinion on the issue which held that the efforts to ban fracking and drilling within the city confines was, in fact, preempted by the Oil and Gas Act.

I'm not aware of any other authority, written authority, certainly not from the state supreme court, and

I'm not aware of any from any other circuit courts.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And, Mr. Rist.

MR. RIST: On that question, I'm also not aware of any other authority, Your Honor.

On the previous issue with what counsel was saying on the, on the Safe Drinking Water Act, there is actually a savings clause in there, and counsel placed that in their memorandum of law that was attached to this motion, that does say that the local authorities can adopt and enforce law or regulation respecting drinking water.

But I think one of the other issues that we're dealing with here is that this is a state implemented permit. That was what was tendered to the Court. This permit has -- was granted by the West Virginia DEP. It's not sent out by the EPA. And I do think that we're going to have to flesh out the issue as to whether or not that is a federal issue and that this falls under the Safe Drinking Water Act or if we're dealing with just looking at the laws on the issuance of the UIC permit by the West Virginia DEP under the West Virginia Code. So there could be an issue with that. I'm, frankly, not able to present that today. I think that would have to be something that we would bring up during a later hearing in this case.

THE COURT: All right. Just one moment.

1 I'll ask you, finally, do the parties have 2 anything further to present at this time? 3 MR. MILLER: No, Your Honor, unless you'd like to 4 hear from the witness to describe to you the number of wells 5 which we operate, which I've already proffered to the Court. 6 MR. RIST: And I don't have any objection to the 7 proffer that was made. I believe that to be true. 8 I will tell the Court that I made a mistake in something I said earlier. I forgot, Danny Webb actually has 9 10 two UIC wells. I don't know that it matters, but I want to 11 make sure that we're clear on that. And so we think --12 there's three that we know of, there may be four UIC wells 13 in Fayette County. But there's three, if you're dealing 14 with this party and the other party that we know have come 15 forward, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Thank you. I would ask the parties 17 what probably was already evident, but is this the first 18 such ordinance of this kind by any county in the state of 19 West Virginia so far as you are aware? 20 MR. RIST: It is, as far as we know, Your Honor. 21 MR. MILLER: It is, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Thank you. 23 The Court, for purposes of the temporary 24 restraining order only, accepts the factual statement set 25 forth in the Complaint. Based thereon, the Court finds that

the plaintiff is subject to irreparable harm were temporary restraining relief not granted.

The Court further finds that, in view of the comprehensive nature of the West Virginia Oil and Gas Act and that of the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act, that there is a likelihood of success on the merits by the plaintiff in this matter, and that, taking into account the public interest, the Court finds that an injunction at this stage is in the public interest, that the balance of equities tip in favor of the plaintiff, and the Court accordingly awards the temporary restraining order relief. Subject, however, to the posting of adequate security.

And at this point, I would hear the parties on that issue as to what it should be.

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, from the standpoint of the plaintiff, at this point, we don't know of any financial or monetary harm that would occur to the Commission by the granting of this temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. As was conceded at this point, the prosecutor apparently doesn't intend to issue any cease and desist orders, so I don't see where there is any immediate and irreparable harm they are going to suffer by the granting of the TRO. I think, therefore, for that reason, a nominal bond is all that would be required in this case.

And by that, I am suggesting \$500 or some nominal amount be

1 posted as bond. 2 MR. RIST: Your Honor, I, frankly, agree. I don't 3 know that a huge bond needs to be posted. If it's something 4 nominal, that's fine. 5 THE COURT: The Court will direct the posting of a 6 \$10,000 bond. And I take it that that's something that 7 could be done immediately? 8 MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor. Very short notice, 9 we can do that. 10 THE COURT: The Court issues the temporary 11 restraining order for a period of 14 days, as I've 12 indicated. As a consequence, the next hearing in the matter 13 will be scheduled for February 4th, at 10:00 a.m. 14 I'm going to suggest this to the parties, that you 15 confer and see if you can't agree on two things: 16 One, that the temporary restraining order be continued 17 for a further week, to February 11th at 10:00 a.m.; and, 18 two, that you undertake to stipulate all facts, to the 19 extent you can, in order to save substantial effort and time 20 at the hearing. 21 I would expect that the parties ought to be able to 22 stipulate to most everything as set forth in the Complaint 23 by agreement insofar as those are factual matters. The law

matter is quite different, and the parties, if need be, will

be given an opportunity to proffer their brief once we have

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reached a point where the matter is heard on preliminary injunction and has been taken under advisement by the Court.

I would welcome, however, any briefing that you might want to do in advance of that.

And so, having in mind that basically we first need to establish the facts and that you likely will be able to stipulate to much of them, I'm wondering whether or not it would be feasible for counsel to, within the next 10 days, have worked up a stipulation of facts, and then, on the basis of that, any briefing that could be done to follow immediately.

Let me ask from your own schedules whether or not it's feasible for you to do that?

MR. MILLER: I believe it is for the plaintiff, Your Honor, yes.

MR. RIST: It's also feasible to us, Your Honor. And I'll just let the Court know, we're fine with the TRO continuing through the February 11th hearing. We're not going to have an issue with that. We'll agree with that.

THE COURT: Well, that will give us a little more time then for briefing beforehand, which I believe will probably be valuable in that I suspect you're going to be able to agree pretty much on what the facts are. And in the final analysis, it simply comes down to whether or not the ordinance is a lawful act.

1 So first with respect to the 10 days for stipulation, 2 is that feasible? 3 MR. RIST: Yes, Your Honor. 4 MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: When you've reached that stipulation 6 then, I'll ask you to file it with the Court, and briefing 7 can proceed on the basis of it. Insofar as the, as the 8 briefing is concerned, I take it that the appropriate thing 9 would be for the plaintiff to file the first brief. And how 10 much time after that 10 days, after that stipulation is 11 arrived at, do you need for that purpose, do you believe, 12 Mr. Miller? 13 MR. MILLER: Three days will be fine, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: How long? 15 MR. MILLER: Three days. 16 THE COURT: All right. And so with that coming in 17 in three days, is another week enough for you, Mr. Rist? 18 MR. RIST: Yes, Your Honor, that's adequate. 19 THE COURT: And that takes care of 10 days of the 20 time. And I believe that leaves us with another three days 21 or so in which you could file a reply. 22 In the meantime, I understand that the parties to be in 23 agreement that the temporary restraining order could be 24 continued for another seven days to February 11th, at 25 10 o'clock?

1 MR. RIST: Yes, Your Honor, that's correct. 2 MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: I probably should say, throughout the 4 entirety of that day would probably be a better thing to 5 say, and that's the way it will be framed. 6 And so with that, I would ask the parties whether or 7 not you have anything further at this time? 8 MR. MILLER: Nothing further, Your Honor. 9 MR. RIST: Your Honor, I think I should clarify 10 the, as far as the scope of the restraining order, in the 11 document that was submitted by the plaintiff, it was 12 restraining a number of parties that aren't present in this 13 action. My understanding would be that the scope of this 14 would only apply to, basically, the three defendants that 15 were named, the County Commission of Fayette County, as far 16 as sending out a cease and desist order or taking some 17 action against the defendants. Is that --18 THE COURT: Do you wish to be heard on that 19 matter, Mr. Miller? 20 MR. MILLER: I do, Your Honor. I think it needs 21 to be broader than that. The ordinance also included 22 enactment of private citizens through its powers delegated 23 to private citizens to enforce this action. So I think the 24 TRO order itself would have to basically indicate that the 25 ordinance itself is, at this point, invalid and no lawful

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       effect until such time as otherwise determined by the Court,
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       so that we're not at risk of private citizen suits or other
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       action taken.
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                 THE COURT: Anything further on the point?
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                 MR. RIST: No, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: It seems to me that the most reach
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       of -- the greatest reach of the temporary restraining order
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       would be the defendants in this action and those acting in
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       concert with them, and so the breadth of the temporary
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       restraining order would be limited to that extent.
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            Is there anything further?
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                 MR. RIST: No, Your Honor.
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                 MR. MILLER: No, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: If not, then we'll stand continued as
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       indicated and we'll await your further submissions.
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            Thank you.
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                 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I do have one query.
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            Did you want us to prepare a written order including
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       findings of the Court for submission?
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                 THE COURT: I'd be happy for you to do that. Are
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       you able to do that today?
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                 MR. MILLER: We can do that, yes.
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                 THE COURT: And run a copy of that by the defense
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       counsel, and if you are able to reach agreement on what has
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       taken place today, that's fine. If you can't, then you'll
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       simply have to furnish what you propose to the Court, in the
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       absence of agreement, and the Court will then take that into
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       account in framing the order.
            So we'll hear from you later today, I take it?
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                 MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
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                 THE COURT: Thank you.
                 THE CLERK: All rise.
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            (Proceedings concluded at 10:45 a.m.)
 9
                        CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER
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            I, Catherine L. Schutte-Stant, Federal Official Court
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       Reporter, in and for the United States District Court, for
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       the Southern District of West Virginia, do hereby certify
       that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the
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14
       stenographically reported proceedings held in the
15
       above-entitled matter.
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                      Dated February 2, 2016.
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18
                  /s/ CATHERINE L. SCHUTTE-STANT, RMR, CRR
19
                      CATHERINE L. SCHUTTE-STANT, RMR, CRR
                      FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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